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Military presence on foreign soil is an old phenomenon, existing since Antiquity. Each 
metropolis would station troops on the soil of its colonies, in order to protect its interests 
and people. From its own perspective, International Law has always been fascinated by 
irregular situations such as this, the need for a legal regulation being obvious, since 
sacred principles are touched, such as the territorial integrity of states, the right of peoples 
to self-determination, state sovereignty, and others. Selected scholars have written on the 
subject and most states have treated the matter from a strategic angle, as Military Bases 
can be found all around the world, nowadays.
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Military Bases exist under various forms and types. They may be the result of leases, 
stationing of troops, United Nations resolutions, bilateral defence agreements, regional 
security agreements, post-war/peace agreements, joint utilization agreements, just to 
name the major ones. On top of those, one may be confronted with special cases, such as 
the US Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba or the Panama Canal case, or even the 
British Military Bases in Cyprus.      
 
These special cases are often known to jurists with the Latin expression “sui generis” (in 
English: “of its own kind”). Indeed, they present so many different characteristics that 
they cannot easily be placed under any of the known categories. That is why each one of 
them has to be analyzed extensively, in order to understand how it works. 
 
What are the characteristics of a military base that need to be addressed? The reader will 
not be surprised to learn that various issues are related to the situation of the installation 
and use of a military base. Construction, functioning, administration, jurisdiction, 
diplomatic, fiscal and customs privileges, international responsibility and withdrawal of 
the troops concerned are some of them. Only through their meticulous study one may 
discover the legal regime applicable. 
 
One of the idiomorphic cases we refer to above is that of the British Military Bases in 
Cyprus (BMBC). Frequently cited (by the UK) as “Sovereign Base Areas”, the BMBC 
constitute a rare case in International Law, as they are neither independent, nor a colony; 
The special case of the BMBC 
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they are expressly not European Union soil (the acquis communautaire not being applied 
to them, but only to their residents, who are Cypriot citizens); they do not file reports to 
the United Nations Organization; they are a peculiar kind of military bases, subordinated 
to the Ministry of Defence of the UK, while functioning in a state-like way.  
 
Different dates may be quoted as the beginning of the issue of the BMBC. As far as we 
are concerned, we have chosen 1956, the year when Nasser, the then Egyptian President, 
had announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal. At that moment, the British had 
realised that the retention of their military bases in Cyprus was becoming a sine qua non 
condition within the framework of their efforts to control the neuralgic region of the 
Middle East. Their plans came in direct opposition with the global tendency towards 
decolonization, on one side, and the anti-colonial struggle of EOKA (National 
Organization of Cypriot Fighters) in Cyprus itself, on the other side. After long 
discussions within the British Parliament, the solution was found: the island of Cyprus 
would become independent under certain conditions, which would safeguard the British 
interests. More precisely, two military bases would remain under the sovereignty of the 
United Kingdom, accompanied with numerous other sites and installations. 
 
Following the intercommunal tensions of 1963-64, President Makarios made a critical 
choice with regard to the status quo which emerged, as a result. Instead of promoting the 
protection of Cyprus by the NATO – a young regional security organization at the time – 
he preferred the installation of an International force in Cyprus, the UNFICYP (United 
Nations Force in Cyprus). Nowadays, we can imagine what would be the situation if 
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NATO came to Cyprus at that time; nevertheless, this could be the title of a separate 
doctoral thesis! We had better looked into the analysis of the legal status of the BMBC 
and the sovereignty exercised on them. 
 
Jurists like definitions. And the truth is that definitions clarify many situations, since their 
author must really master the object, so that all elements are among the few drafted lines. 
A definition must be sufficiently comprehensive and concise, at the same time. 
 
We have vacillated between various texts. Some were long, other seemed too succinct. In 
the end, we came up with the following definition for the legal status of the BMBC: 
“Territories on which the United Kingdom has retained, for purely military and defence 
purposes, an aggregate of disperse sovereign rights, which are well defined by the 1960 
Treaties, and which are accompanied by the limitations and precisions included in those 
Treaties”. Proper attention must be given to all components of this definition, since each 
one of them has its own importance. 
 
A realistic approach, on the basis of the International behaviour of the UK, obliges us to 
acknowledge the existence of sovereign rights in favour of the British. In fact, the 
sovereignty on the BMBC did not pass from the UK to the Republic of Cyprus through 
the 1960 Treaties. The British attempted to retain their sovereignty over the Bases on an 
absolute level, because of the strategic importance of the latter to them, as already 
mentioned. Their regulatory participation in the negotiations of the 1960 Treaties allowed 
them to introduce in the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, as well as in the other 
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legal texts surrounding it (Treaties of Establishment, Alliance and Guarantee), multiple 
shields, assuring the integrity of their military bases. However, the said Treaties also 
comprised a certain number of annexes (called “Appendixes”), which are an integral part 
of the legal situation of the BMBC in general and which limit and specify the British 
sovereignty. 
 
One such text is the well known Appendix “O”, which limits UK sovereignty on the 
BMBC considerably, since their use can only be of military or defensive nature. 
Appendix “O” is obviously a unilateral declaration of the UK, but, further from the fact 
that such declarations are anyway considered among the sources of International Law that 
bind the States who issue them, this declaration has been deposited with the official 
depositary of International Treaties, the United Nations. Moreover, it has also been 
accepted by the Archbishop Makarios III (representing the Greek Cypriots) and Dr. 
Küçük (representing the Turkish Cypriots) by a letter of response. Taking into 
consideration that International Treaties must have no special form, according to 
Customary International Law, we have there a perfectly valid International Treaty! 
Finally, the uninterrupted practice of the UK itself, which abides by the Appendix “O” 
since 1960, proves this fact. 
 
Appendix “O” constitutes the cornerstone of any analysis of the legal status of the 
BMBC. Through this text, the British have engaged themselves: a) to use the Bases only 
for military purposes; b) to collaborate with the Republic, and; c) to protect the interests 
of the people residing and/or working there. They have also committed themselves to a 
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certain number of other obligations of diverse nature, which are written in an elaborated 
manner in Appendix “O”. All these commitments, not only do they limit UK sovereignty, 
but precise at the same time that already limited sovereignty, in a considerable way. 
 
Another text, Appendix “R”, obliges further the British to pay a certain sum of money to 
the Republic of Cyprus, apparently for the various concessions that the latter is offering 
to them. This sum had been regularly paid before 1965, but stopped being so after that 
date, on the pretext that the sum would allegedly not be equitably distributed to the two 
communities (NB: the British had this way widened the gap between the Greek-Cypriots 
and the Turkish-Cypriots…). There are, for the moment, three special resolutions of the 
Cypriot House of Representatives (Parliament), in 1979, 2005 and 2012, calling for the 
payment by the UK of its dues. Nevertheless, it would be perhaps more prudent for the 
Republic to think again before officially claiming that money, after examining the Cuban 
practice under the otherwise much criticized Fidel Castro, who, in a form of silent 
opposition a la Gandhi, does not accept any money from the United States in exchange 
for the Base they hold in Guantanamo Bay. This would also be a way of denouncing, at 
least de facto, the existence of the BMBC against the will of the Cypriot people. 
 
Perhaps the most useful argument for proving the limited character of the UK’s 
sovereignty over the BMBC is offered by a less known text, Appendix “P”. As jurists 
know from Roman Law, the rights of a proprietor in Private Law are the following five 
gerunds: habendi (title) – possidendi (possession) – fruendi (usufruct) – utendi (use) – 
abutendi (disposal). In our case and transposing these gerunds to Public International 
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Law, the UK admittedly enjoys the first four, but not the last one, which is the most 
important! Appendix “P”, widely ignored by politicians, journalists and academics alike, 
bearing the title “The future of the Sovereign Base Areas”, simply but clearly states that, 
when the British decide to give the bases away, they could not do so but to the benefit of 
the Republic of Cyprus. This text is more powerful than the relevant clause in the Treaty 
of Utrecht, with regard to Gibraltar, to the benefit of Spain: in that case, the Spanish will 
have to pay to the British a certain sum to get the Rock back, they will have to buy it; 
here, the whole “transaction” will be “free of charge”! In other words, the UK cannot 
dispose of the BMBC as it wishes. Consequently, its sovereignty over the BMBC is to be 
considered as sensibly limited. 
 
Having successfully established the limited extent of the UK’s sovereignty over the 
BMBC, one could at this stage wonder how this abnormal situation is to be fixed, since it 
is obvious from the above that the preservation of the BMBC in their current form is a 
non-option.    
 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT; 1969), applied as Customary 
International Law (since the 1960 Treaties had been concluded before its entry into 
force), constitutes the most appropriate and just way to look into the future of the BMBC. 
The flagrant violation of jus cogens (Art. 53) and/or of jus cogens superveniens (Art. 64) 
provisions, such as the obligation of States to a complete decolonization, the principles of 
state sovereignty, of territorial integrity and of self-determination of the peoples, as well 
as the grave violation of Appendixes “O” and “R” and the fundamental change of 
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circumstances (rebus sic stantibus), should be enough to the Republic of Cyprus for 
asking, at least as a first step, for a renegotiation of the legal status of the BMBC, in view 
of liberating the European Union from one of the few last irregular legal situations that 
still exist on its soil. 
 
Part V of the VCLT is where all articles relevant to the invalidity, termination and 
suspension of the operation of treaties are found. Articles 48 (Error), 49 (Fraud), 51-52 
(Coercion) are possibilities that need to be examined in depth, through the analysis of 
newly released confidential documents. But Articles 53 (Jus Cogens) and 64 (Jus Cogens 
Superveniens), as well as Article 62 (Rebus Sic Stantibus) are sufficient for our purposes, 
with the elements already in hand.  
 
Article 53 provides for the nullity of treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of 
general International Law and is completed by Article 64, which deals with treaties 
conflicting with a new peremptory norm of general International Law. 
 
The UK has undoubtedly violated a series of International Law principles. Focusing on 
the most problematic Treaty of Guarantee, a first violation stems from the fact that the 
Treaty has been concluded in perpetuity, without possibility of alteration, a clear 
derogation of the Republic of Cyprus’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (as set out by 
the UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) and by Article 185 of the Cypriot 
Constitution). The same fact violates the right of the Cypriot people to self-determination, 
since they never got to vote on their own Constitution or on the other texts surrounding it, 
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including the Treaty of Guarantee. Had they voted on the question of the preservation or 
non-preservation of the BMBC, the result would definitely be in favour of the second 
choice. The Cypriot people cannot freely determine their own destiny and do not have 
territorial supremacy over their own territory. Thus, peremptory norms, as expressed by 
both, Article 1 Para. 2 of the UN Charter and by Resolution 2625 (XXV) of the UN 
General Assembly, are constantly being violated by the UK. The violation of Article 53 
and/or Article 64 by the Treaty of Guarantee renders this text null and void. 
 
UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), referred to above, has given birth to 
another International Law principle, the one of a true obligation to decolonize. In the case 
of Cyprus, we are facing a situation of uncompleted decolonisation. Indeed, the UK, by 
keeping a portion of the Cypriot territory in 1960, even through an allegedly valid treaty 
in legal terms, has violated its obligation to decolonise the entire territory of the Isle of 
Cyprus – contrary to the principle of uti possidetis juris, i.e. a state right to the 
maintenance of the territorial unity of the former colony – and has, by this fact, engaged 
its international responsibility.    
 
UK violations extend to Appendix “R”, too, as already mentioned. The fact that, since 
1965, no “financial assistance” has been given to the Republic of Cyprus is a flagrant 
violation of the British commitments.  
 
Turning to Article 62 VCLT, the provision dealing with the fundamental change of 
circumstances, it is undeniable that the situation in Cyprus has changed quite a bit in the 
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last 50 years; after all, it is half a century! The provision requires for the specific 
circumstances that have changed to have constituted an essential basis of the consent of 
the parties to be bound by the treaty and that the effect of the change is to radically 
transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty. Such a change 
has occurred by the reduction by 1/3 of the territory under the Republic’s effective 
control, as a direct result of the Turkish military invasion of 1974, an event which was 
clearly not foreseeable back in 1960. It had been, undoubtedly, the prospective of 
political stability that had pushed the Cypriot representatives into the signature of the 
1960 Treaties; this situation, however, having radically changed in 1974, the Republic 
needed more space in order to place some of its 200,000 refugees coming from the North, 
as well as to foster the economic development of the adjacent regions or of those 
enclaved within the BMBC, in the absence of free lands elsewhere. 
 
The plethora of legal arguments presented here are, in our opinion, sufficient for the 
Republic of Cyprus to denounce the 1960 Treaties, in part or in their entirety, despite the 
fact that this eventuality is not provided for by the said texts. It is widely accepted by 
scholars that there exists a Customary right for a state to proceed to unilateral 
denunciation of a treaty, especially if that treaty has been concluded to last in perpetuity... 
In any case, the practical result of such act would be that the parties (Cyprus and the UK, 
in the exclusion of Greece and Turkey, whose guarantor status should no longer exist) 
will need to renegotiate the legal status of the British Bases, to start with. It would be in 
the best interest of the Republic of Cyprus, as well as of the UK – the present irregular 
Conclusion 
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situation not being possible to maintain – to reach an agreement on a lease or even a joint 
utilisation of the Bases. Another possibility, in order not to abruptly destabilise the 
already troubled Middle East region, would be to transform the Bases into NATO Bases.      
 
We could not imagine of a better way to conclude our article than by citing the former 
Chief of Staff of the Turkish Military, General Hilmi Özkök, who was addressing the 
Turkish Cypriots, a few days before they were supposed to vote for the Annan Plan in 
April 2004. Özkök, being a thorough expert on regional strategy, was trying to convince 
the Turkish Cypriots to vote against the Annan Plan, as it would (in his view, largely 
expressing Turkish views) give away a part of Turkey’s power in the region. His main 
argument was the following: “Let me remind you how Britain shows great care to 
maintain its sovereign bases on the island”… 
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i For all relevant references, please consult the author’s book: Sozos-Christos Theodoulou, Bases militaires 
en droit international: le cas de Chypre (Mannheim und Möhnesee:  Bibliopolis, 2006). 
